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1. Introduction 
Climate change adaptation and climate-related disaster risk reduction have been 
recognized as a priority worldwide. Ambitious initiatives have been taken at global level, 
such as the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the 2015 Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction, as well as several European policy actions like the EU 
strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change.  
The series of PESETA projects of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) have intended to 
provide a better quantification of the possible consequences of future climate change for 
Europe. The aim of the JRC PESETA III project is to further improve that knowledge, 
narrowing uncertainty gaps. The study follows three stages: climate modelling, assessing 
the climate impacts for a number of impact categories and the economic analysis of the 
impacts.  
The climate dataset come from the EURO-CORDEX regional climate model runs. All 
climate impact models have run five EURO-CORDEX climate runs, with three sets of 
results: 2030s climate, 2oC scenario and 2080s or high warming scenario. The results for 
the 2oC and 2030s runs are rather similar. Eleven climate impact categories have been 
considered in the study: coastal floods, river floods, droughts, agriculture, energy, 
transport, water resources, habitat loss, forest fires, labour productivity, and mortality 
due to heat. 
The economic task of the project, documented in this report, has two objectives. The first 
objective is to integrate and compare the climate impacts in a consistent way from the 
economic perspective. Each sectoral biophysical impact assessment has its own set of 
metrics. For instance, impacts in the agriculture sector are measured in terms of 
agriculture yield changes, while impacts due to river floods are estimated in terms of 
economic damages and number of people affected.  
That integration homogenises the various climate impact vectors, allowing to derive 
insights regarding the spatial and regional pattern of climate damages in Europe. These 
patterns can be useful to prioritise adaptation funds at the pan-European scale. 
From the eleven sectoral studies in the JRC PESETA III project, five impact areas have 
been fully integrated: labour productivity, river floods, coastal floods, energy, and 
agriculture (the agriculture yield change results come from the ISIMIP study, as analysed 
in the HELIX FP7 project by JRC). For the other sectors, this full, homogenous integration 
was not possible because, being most of the impacts in non-market sectors, their 
economic damage estimates were not obtained. This is for instance the case of habitat 
loss, whose economic consequences are very difficult to estimate, as they would have 
required the implementation of methods to evaluate non-market environmental services 
that go beyond the scope of this study. 
A sixth integrated impact category is human mortality due to heatwaves. There is not a 
dedicated human health study in PESETA III but the results from the study of Forzieri et 
al. (2017) have been integrated into the economic analysis, given their prominent weight 
in the overall economic impact estimates. In this way, that key component of the climate 
damage is taken into account in the economic analysis. 
A second objective of the economic task is to explore the degree to which climate 
impacts cross geographical borders. Climate related disruptions in production or 
consumption in one region affect prices, supply and demand which, in turn, affect other 
countries via international trade. For instance, climate-induced reduction in agricultural 
production in one country will lead to increase in imports and reduction in exports of the 
agricultural goods, all having implications for the trading partners. This transboundary or 
spillover analysis is conducted at two levels: intra-EU and global spillovers. The intra-EU 
analysis refers to how much of the impacts in one region of the EU are due to climate 
impacts in the other EU regions. The global analysis focuses in the additional climate 
impacts in the EU due to climate impacts occurring in the rest of the world. 
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The global transboundary analysis has been made for the four sectors for which global 
impact estimates are available, even if from different climate scenarios. They are labour 
productivity, river floods, energy, and agriculture.  
Two economic models are used, with different methodological approaches and for 
different purposes too. On the one hand, the multi-sectoral CaGE model has been used 
for the comparative static and transboundary analyses; on the other hand, the single-
sector dynamic MaGE model has been used to explore dynamic aspects of impacts. The 
comparison is meant to highlight the results found and as an exploratory tool to ascertain 
and consolidate for future analyses the most suitable approach to this particular type of 
long-term economic evaluation problem. 
The rest of the document is organised in ten sections. Section 2 describes the 
methodological framework. The next six sections deal with the economic analysis of 
impacts in each sector: labour productivity (section 3), river floods (section 4), coastal 
floods (section 5), residential energy demand (section 6), agricultural crops (section 7) 
and mortality (section 8). The transboundary analysis is presented in Section 9. Section 
10 provides an overview of the economic impacts. Section 11 concludes. 
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2. Methodology 
The economic method relies on the use of two economic models with different and 
complementary features: Climate assessment General Equilibrium (CaGE, Pycroft et al. 
2016) and Macro-econometrics for the Global Economy (MaGE, Fouré et al. 2013). CaGE 
is a multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The CGE 
analysis allows accounting for the direct impacts and the additional indirect effects in the 
economy due to the cross-sectoral and cross-country or trade adjustments. The 
computable general equilibrium methodology has been applied in the context of multi-
sector climate impact analyses by several teams, like e.g. Bosello et al. (2012), Reilly et 
al. (2013) and, more recently, OECD (2015) and Hsiang et al. (2017). 
The economic integration with the CaGE model is made in a comparative static context 
where future climate affects the economy as of today. There are two justifications for 
implementing the static approach: first, to keep consistency with the biophysical impact 
analysis, where the direct climate damages are computed on the basis of constant 
exposure data (so current land use, GDP and population); second, to avoid making 
challenging assumptions about the evolution of the economy and demography over the 
next eighty years. By referring the impacts to the present economic structure, one does 
not need to make or derive long-term assumptions on evolution of production factors, 
growth or economic structure that could distort the key findings of the study. 
The relevance of the alternative dynamic framework (in other words, to assess the 
expected climate impacts on the future, projected economic system.) is explored for the 
coastal floods case with the MaGE dynamic growth model, which is able to consider how 
the dynamics of capital accumulation across periods is affected by climate impacts, but 
does not account for international trade. MaGE has been used in this study to analyse the 
possible integration of damaging mechanisms in such a growth-accounting modelling 
paradigm. At the price of losing sectoral detail and cross-country spillovers via 
international trade, this approach can cope with important dynamic effects highly 
relevant for the type of long-time impact assessment under analysis (demographic, 
physical and human capital accumulation and destruction, etc.). 
The analysis is performed with five EU regions, aggregating the EU countries as follows: 
 Northern Europe: Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Denmark 
 UK and Ireland: UK and Ireland 
 Central Europe North: Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland 
 Central Europe South: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania 
 Southern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain. 
For the analysis of impacts of global transboundary effects the rest-of-the-world regions 
are aggregated into 13 regions (see Annex for detail of the aggregation).  
2.1. Economic models 
As already noted, the CaGE CGE analysis allows accounting for the direct impacts (as 
estimated by the biophysical impact models) and the additional indirect effects in the 
economy due to the cross-sectoral and cross-country adjustments. The cross-sectoral 
impacts are effects on other economic sectors or markets of the economy that are linked 
with the sector upon which the climate shock is imposed on via commercial relations (for 
instance the relationship between the crop sector and the agrofood industry). There are 
also indirect effects in other economies due to the trade flows between countries (both 
imports and exports). For instance, if one country faces a large negative shock, its 
production level will fall, which will lead to fewer imports from other economies. This kind 
of analysis is applied to the assessment of the size of the possible transboundary or 
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cross-country climate impacts at two different levels: within Europe and from the rest of 
the world. 
As a consequence, the use of a multi-sector, multi-country general equilibrium model 
such as CaGE permits that the estimated economic impacts include both the direct 
impact of climate change (e.g. the losses in the agriculture sector due to lower yields) 
and the indirect consequences in the rest of the sectors (e.g. in the agrofood industry) 
and the rest of the EU (considered via trade flows). 
Another advantage of the CGE methodology is that it is actually capturing implicit or 
market adaptation by definition, via the changes in market prices. For instance, when the 
agriculture productivity is affected by climate change, the agriculture market and all 
other markets of the economy are adjusted via the economy price system. This is a 
general and broad process that affects all input and good markets of the country affected 
by climate and also the same markets in the countries with which the country has trade 
relationships. Regarding adaptation modelling, the climate impact sectoral results have 
not taken into account planned or public adaptation, unless otherwise stated. Some 
sectoral models have considered private-level adaptation, like in the case of using air 
conditioning for cooling in the energy sector. 
The CaGE model considers three main channels in the economic transmission of direct 
economic damages into the economic system: changes in productivity (e.g. due to lower 
agriculture yields), changes in capital stock (e.g. due to the flood damages) and changes 
in consumption (e.g. repairing of flood damages reduces the consumption possibilities of 
households, which consequently reduces their overall welfare). 
The results estimated with the quasi-static framework of the CaGE model address the 
question: "what the economy would look like if the future climate occurs today?" The 
framework considers how climate impacts affect the current production, consumption, 
savings and investment. Because the model's database represents annual stocks and 
flows of the global economy, the results obtained reflect annual changes to the database. 
In other words, the estimated economic impacts represent a change in annual welfare or 
GDP, but the possible effects on long-term economic growth are not considered in this 
assessment because the framework is static.  
A second model, MaGE (Fouré et al. 2013), permits exploring the dynamic implications of 
the climate shocks. MaGE follows a recursive dynamic approach, insofar as the terminal 
values from any period are used as the starting point for the next period. It uses future 
projections of GDP and population from the shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs, 
Keywan et al. 2017), in particular SSP3. MaGE considers that there is a process of capital 
accumulation over time and population dynamics, which together with technical progress 
explain the dynamic evolution of GDP or output. In this study, the MaGE model is tested 
just for the coastal impact assessment, with the purpose of exploring possible ways of 
integrating the two described methodologies (e.g. multisectoral comparative statics and 
single-sector, dynamic growth accounting). 
Two metrics of economic impacts are used: gross domestic product (GDP) and welfare 
changes. GDP is a measure of the value of the production of all goods and services of a 
country in one year. Welfare refers to the utility or satisfaction obtained by households, 
closely related to their consumption; the higher the consumption the higher the welfare. 
The GDP metrics has the advantage of computing how the overall economy would be 
affected (not just consumption). However, one advantage of welfare is that it focuses on 
how much the consumption possibilities of households are affected by climate change. A 
second reason to prefer the use of welfare rather than GDP is that some climate impacts 
directly affect the consumption possibilities of households (like repairing flood damages 
in residential buildings) but do not affect GDP, therefore the GDP metrics does not 
account for the climate impacts, and would underestimate their scale. GDP and welfare 
are presented in absolute terms (2007 Euro) and as percentage change.  
It is important to note that the direct damages of the reference period are assumed to be 
embedded in the base year of the model. Therefore, the welfare analysis takes only into 
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account the additional damages under the warming levels compared to those of the base 
year. All reported economic impacts are measured in 2007 Euro. 
2.2. Transboundary effects or spillover analysis 
The economic effects originating from climate shocks in other regions do not depend on 
'own' climate change effects, but is a function of the 'outside' climate impacts and the 
bilateral trade connection between the 'own' and 'outside' regions, which includes the 
competitiveness effects. The magnitude of these effects can be measured as a change in 
absolute GDP or welfare in the recipient region. 
For instance, let consider the case a specific climate impact like agriculture yield changes. 
Let assume that climate impacts lead to reduced yields in EU and also in one of its main 
agriculture trading partners, the US. There is not only the effect on the EU, which would 
see a reduction in productivity in the agriculture sector, leading to reduced GDP in the 
EU. There is an additional effect on the EU associated to the trade flows because lower 
US agriculture yields will also reduce US GDP, which then will import less products from 
its trading partners, including the EU, leading to an additional negative effect on EU GDP. 
Therefore, EU GDP could be indirectly affected by the reduction in US GDP due to 
agriculture climate impacts. That additional effect is what is identified here as the 
transboundary or spillover impact.  
While the analysis regarding climate impacts in the EU has welfare or consumption as the 
preferred economic metrics, in the transboundary analysis the GDP seems a more 
appropriate metrics. This is because the trade channels are directly taken into account in 
GDP (from the demand perspective, GDP is equal to domestic demand – private 
consumption, government consumption and investment - plus exports minus imports), 
while they affect indirectly the consumption possibilities. Anyhow, as climate impacts 
affecting directly welfare barely affect GDP, the spillover analysis in GDP terms remains 
also somehow limited in capturing the full range of possible transnational effects. 
Two settings are considered: 
 Intra-EU transboundary analysis. This evaluates the GDP loss in one EU region due to 
the impacts in other EU regions. In the results of this study, this transboundary 
impact is already computed in the overall loss of the specific EU region.  
 Global transboundary analysis. In this case, the GDP loss in the EU region is due to 
the impacts in the rest of the world. That loss is additional to the loss registered by 
the EU region. 
2.3. Climate runs 
The PESETA III project has considered a set of twelve bias-adjusted EURO-CORDEX 
climate change projections. A core set of five runs has been selected because all teams 
could not run all cases due to resource limitations. The selection of core runs has been 
made so that it is able to reproduce, as accurately as possible, the inter-model variability 
of the entire ensemble (see Dosio, 2018). Furthermore, the five core runs have been 
chosen so that the regional climate models (RCMs) are driven by 5 different global 
circulation models (GCMs). The economic analysis for Europe builds on the sectoral bio-
physical impacts results for the average of the (minimum) 5 core GCM EURO-CORDEX 
models:  
- R1-G1: CNRM-CERFACS-CNRM-CM5_r1i1p1_CLMcom-CCLM4-8-17 
- R1-G2: ICHEC-EC-EARTH_r12i1p1_CLMcom-CCLM4-8-17 
- R3-G4: IPSL-IPSL-CM5A-MR_r1i1p1_IPSL-INERIS-WRF331F 
- R5-G5: MOHC-HadGEM2-ES_r1i1p1_SMHI-RCA4 
- R5-G3: MPI-M-MPI-ESM-LR_r1i1p1_SMHI-RCA4 
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The impacts under the 2030s climate, 2oC scenario and 2080s (or high warming 
scenario) are evaluated. Since the results from the 2030s climate are very similar to 
those of the 2°C scenario, this report mostly focuses on the 2°C and high warming 
scenarios. The impacts under the EURO-CORDEX warming scenarios are compared with 
those under nowadays (1981-2010) climate conditions (control period).  
The agriculture and human health studies use different climate runs (see the relevant 
sections for details). 
Regarding the climate impacts in the rest of the word, the climate scenarios come from a 
number of different sources: agriculture and labour productivity use the ISIMIP fast track 
climate scenarios, while river floods and energy use the HELIX project climate runs. 
The following sections deal with the analysis of climate impacts for each of the five 
impact categories taken into account in the economic framework. Each section starts with 
the description of the direct damages, as they have been computed by the climate 
impact models, followed by the economic analysis of impacts in the EU. 
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3. Labour productivity 
This section analyses the economic implications of climate-induced changes in labour 
productivity (defined as the production per unit of labour). The analysis of impacts in 
Europe are based on the CORDEX climate data (Gosling et al. 2018), while the indirect 
impact of climate-related labour productivity changes from the rest of the world (i.e. 
outside of the EU regions) is based on the climate data from global ISIMIP analysis2. The 
ISIMIP study builds on an ensemble of 7 impact models and 5 GCMs. 
The main conclusions of this section are the following: 
 Climate impacts in Europe: under the high warming scenario, annual welfare losses 
could be 27 bn €, which would be significantly reduced to 7 bn € under the 2oC 
warming scenario.  
 There is a very clear North-South gradient regarding economic losses, which rise 
when moving to southern Europe. 
3.1. Labour productivity shock and economic integration 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show percentage losses in labour productivity for the five EU 
regions and the EU aggregate for all the climate scenarios, reporting the mean and 
min/max range across the climate models. The mean EU labour productivity loss can be 
around 1% (-0.2% to -3%) under 2oC warming and rise to 3.4% (-0.6% to -9.8%) under 
the higher warming scenario. The range of results across climate model runs, underlying 
the mean values, indicates that the labour productivity shock can be larger by a factor of 
3 when compared to the mean. 
In general, the mean labour productivity reductions in Europe increase when moving to 
lower latitudes, and can almost double the EU average value in Southern Europe under 
the high warming scenario. 
Figure 1: Change in labour productivity (% and bn €) 
 
                                           
2 Assessment of global climate change impacts on labour productivity: JRC/SVQ/2015/J.1/0030/NC. 
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Table 1: Change in labour productivity (%) 
 
Note: mean and min/max range across the climate models 
3.2. Economic implications on EU regions 
The shock integrated in the economic model represents the productivity change of a unit 
of labour (i.e. how much production or output changes per unit of labour). The sectors 
affected by the labour productivity shocks are construction and agriculture. In these 
sectors labour is subject to intensive physical work performed outdoors and possible 
exposure to direct sun heat radiation. The magnitude of the economy-wide impact will 
depend, inter alia, on the labour intensity of the affected sectors and the relative sizes of 
the sectors in the economy. 
The EU GDP loss would go from a mere 0.05% in the 2oC warming to a more substantial 
0.2% in the higher warming scenario (Figure 2, Table 2). There is a clear North-South 
gradient regarding GDP impacts: the impacts become larger when moving to the 
southern regions. Southern Europe's GDP can lose from 0.1% (2030s/2oC) to around 
0.4% in the 2080s. In value terms about half of the EU GDP losses would occur in the 
Southern Europe region (Table 2), with Central Europe regions accounting for over 40% 
of the total, and northern regions for the remaining 5-10%. 




Note that the absolute GDP and welfare losses are rather similar (Table 2). Yet the 
relative welfare losses (Figure 3, expressed as percentage over welfare or consumption 
of the base year) are higher than those of the GDP losses (in percentage terms of GDP); 
that is because consumption is one of the components of GDP, which also includes 
government consumption, investment and net external trade. The same absolute value 
expressed in welfare terms is higher than in GDP terms. 
Figure 3: Welfare change due to the labour productivity shock (% of welfare) 
 




4. River floods 
This section presents the analysis of economic consequences of river flooding in Europe 
for three target horizons: 2030s, 2oC and 2080s The input into the economic analysis is 
based on biophysical modelling described in Alfieri et al. (2018). 
The main conclusions of this section are the following: 
 Climate impacts in Europe: under the high warming scenario, welfare losses could be 
15 bn €, which would be reduced to 9 bn € under the 2oC warming scenario.  
 There is a very clear North-South gradient regarding damages, increasing when 
moving to southern Europe. 
4.1. River flood damage and economic integration 
The damages from river flooding for the EU regions and EU are presented in Figure 4, for 
the three climate futures (2030s, 2oC and 2080s). The scale of the regional damages is 
on the left of Figure 4, while the scale for the EU damages is that on the right; the 
vertical lines represent the min-max ranges of impacts. The EU damage from flooding 
reaches 7.2bn € in 2030s or at 2oC and 12.1bn € in 2080s. The figure also presents the 
decomposition of impacts by type of asset damaged. Most of the damage would occur in 
residential buildings (about 80%), followed by agriculture and capital assets.  
Figure 4: Damage due to river floods (bn €) 
 
Table 3 shows the value of the direct damages (additional with respect to the damage in 
the base or control period). The minimum and maximum of the climate model ensemble's 
results highlight a range of uncertainty associated with the results. For example, while 
the mean flood damage in Central Europe South in 2080s is estimated at 3.6 bn €, the 
maximum can be as high as 9.5 bn €, i.e. around 2.5 times higher. Some of the 
minimum values are negative in some regions because the damage under the climate 
future is lower than the damage in the base period. This can be due to less extreme 
precipitation in a particular climate run. 
12 
Table 3: Damage due to river floods (bn €) 
 
Note: damages are additional to those of the base period (1976-2005). Mean and min/max range across the 
climate models 
The distribution of damage across damage categories (industry, agriculture and 
residential) and across the EU regions is illustrated in Figure 5, also approximately 
representing the year at which the 2oC warming is reached (vertical line). The proportion 
of flood-related damage in each region does not change significantly, with Central Europe 
North having its share increased by the 2030s and then remains stable until the 2080s. 
The share of total damage by the categories appears constant over the time horizon.  
Figure 5: Damage due to river floods - cumulative by region (left) and damage type 
(right) for base period (1976-2005), 2030s and 2080s 
 
Note: Inset plots show respective damage as fractions of 100% total. 
4.2. Economic implications on EU regions 
The river flood damage assessment consists of damages to agriculture, industry, 
commerce, infrastructure and residential buildings. Agricultural direct damages are 
accounted for in the economic model as a change in the productivity of the agricultural 
sector. Damages to industry, commerce and infrastructure are represented as damage to 
the economy's capital stock in those sectors. Damage to residential structures is 
represented as an increase in households' subsistence spending. 
Figure 6 represents the direct and the induced welfare loss (measured in absolute terms, 
bn €) for the EU and its regions under the various climate scenarios. The welfare loss is 
about 10% higher than the direct damage. Damages are much smaller in the Northern 
regions, becoming larger when moving south.  
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Figure 6: Direct damage vs welfare loss by EU region due to river floods (bn €) 
 
The economic implications in terms of GDP and welfare are reported in Figure 7, 
Figure 8 and Table 4. The magnitudes of impacts on the EU regions are very similar 
for the 2030s and the 2oC scenarios. The losses in the 2080 are approximately twice 
the losses in the 2030s. The total GDP loss in the EU is 2.7bn € (0.02%) in the 
2030s/2oC and almost 4.5bn € (0.04%) in the 2080s. The largest GDP losses could 
occur in Central Europe South (0.04% to 0.05%). The largest relative increase in 
losses is simulated in Southern Europe, where GDP losses increase steeply from 
0.02% in the 2030s to 0.05% in the 2080s. 
Figure 7: Change in GDP due to river floods (% of GDP) 
 
The largest welfare losses (Figure 8) could occur in Central Europe South (around 
0.3% for all the three scenarios) and Southern Europe (up to 0.3% in the 2080s 
scenario). In absolute terms, the welfare losses are approximately three times the 
GDP losses; that can be explained by the large weight of residential damages in the 
overall direct damage. Residential damages affect households' consumption but not 
directly to production (GDP). 
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Figure 8: Change in welfare due to river floods (% of welfare) 
 
Table 4: GDP and welfare losses from river floods 
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5. Coastal floods 
This section presents the analysis of the economic consequences of coastal flooding in 
Europe for three climate scenarios. The input into the economic analysis is based on 
biophysical modelling reported in Vousdoukas et al. (2017). 
The main conclusions of this section is that under the high warming scenario, welfare 
losses could be 35 bn €, which would be very significantly reduced to 4 bn € under the 
2oC warming scenario. 
5.1. Coastal floods damage and economic integration 
Figure 9 represents the direct damages due to coastal floods. Those damages relate to 
the static setting, i.e. with constant population and GDP. The figures are much lower than 
those under the dynamic framework, where economic growth and population dynamics 
are considered (the coastal sectoral report explains those differences; Vousdoukas et al., 
2017). The scale of the regional damages is on the left of Figure 9, while the scale for the 
EU damages is that on the right The EU damage from coastal flooding increases to 
around 3 bn € in 2030s and to 29 bn € in 2080s. The minimum and maximum of the 
climate model ensemble's results (values in Table 5) highlight the uncertainty range of 
the results. For example, while the flood damage in Central Europe South in 2080s is 
estimated at mean at 6.8 bn €, the maximum can be as high as 15.8 bn €, i.e. around 
two times higher. 
Figure 9: Damage due to coastal floods (bn €) 
 
The regions with the highest damage are UK & Ireland and Southern Europe, which 
together account for around 60% of the total EU coastal damage. A further 25% of the 
EU damage occurs in Central Europe South. 
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Table 5: Damage due to coastal floods (bn €) 
 
Note: damages are additional to those of the base period (1980-2010). Mean and min/max range across the 
climate models 
The distribution of damage across the damage categories (industry, agriculture and 
residential) and across the EU regions is illustrated in Figure 10. With respect to the 
sectoral damage, most of the damage would happen in residential buildings (about 
80%), capital assets (about 15%) and agriculture (about 5%). The share of total damage 
for each of the damage categories appears constant over the time horizon. The 
proportion of flood-related damage in each region does not change significantly, with 
Southern Europe having its share increased by the 2030s and then remains stable until 
the 2080s. In contrast, the share of the EU damage in UK & Ireland declines slightly until 
the 2030s, then stays constant.  
Figure 10: Damage due to coastal floods - cumulative by region (left) and damage type 
(right) for base period (1980-2010), 2030s and 2080s  
 
Note: Inset plots show respective damage as fractions of 100% total. 
5.2. Economic implications on EU regions 
The coastal flood damage assessment consists of damages to agriculture, industry, 
commerce, infrastructure and residential buildings. Agricultural direct damages are 
accounted for in the CGE economic model as a change in the productivity of the 
agricultural sector. Damages to industry, commerce and infrastructure are represented 
as damage to capital in the economy. Damage to residential structures is represented as 
an increase in households' subsistence spending. 
The magnitudes of impacts on the EU regions are very similar for the 2030s and the 2oC 
scenario (Figure 11, Figure 12 and Table 6). The losses in the 2080s are approximately 
eight times the losses in the 2030s. The total GDP loss in the EU is 1.1/1.3 bn € (0.01%) 
in the 2030s/2oC and almost 10.8 bn € (0.09%) in the 2080s. 2080s GDP losses are 
higher than the EU value for Northern Europe, UK and Ireland, and Southern Europe. 
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Figure 11: Change in GDP due to coastal floods (% of GDP) 
 
In absolute terms, the welfare losses are approximately three times the GDP losses 
(Table 6); the reason is the same as for the case of river floods (i.e., around 80% of the 
direct damage is a welfare reduction – residential buildings damages). The Northern 
Europe, UK and Ireland, and Central Europe South regions would have welfare losses 
(about 0.6%) slightly above those of the EU.  
Figure 12: Change in welfare due to coastal floods (% of welfare) 
 
Table 6: GDP and welfare losses from coastal floods 
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5.3. Dynamic assessment of coastal floods  
This section presents the preliminary assessment of the economic implications of coastal 
floods with the dynamic model MaGE (see Annex for model's description), using the SSP3 
socio-economic projection. 
5.3.1. Model integration 
It is assumed that the capital losses directly erode the stock of capital, while the impact 
on the agricultural sector lowers the GDP level. For the effects on private residential 
buildings, it is assumed that the damages are repaired by reducing households’ 
consumption, leading to a consequent decrease of overall welfare.  
In addition to the GDP losses generated directly by the three impacts, the model 
quantifies the indirect or dynamic effects. MaGE is a recursive model meaning that some 
of the variables measured at time t influence the results of the model at time t+1. For 
instance, the capital stock at time t determines, together with the depreciation rate and 
the investments, the level of the capital stock at time t+1; the investment rate at time t 
affects the investment rate in the following period and the same dynamic mechanism 
characterizes the equation for the saving rates, which has both the saving rate and the 
GDP per capita of the previous period as covariates. These dynamic mechanisms allow to 
quantify the effect on GDP due to a gradual deterioration of these macroeconomic 
variables, which mean that the direct impacts on agriculture, capital and residential 
dwellings cumulate across years. 
5.3.2. Impacts on EU regions 
Table 7 shows the welfare impacts (measured as percentage of GDP) in the EU and its 
five main regions. The EU welfare losses by the end of the century are around 0.4% of 
GDP. The regions where welfare losses are relatively higher are Northern Europe, UK and 
Ireland and the southern European region, a similar regional pattern to that of the static 
analysis.  














2021-2050 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
2°C warming 0.08 0.21 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.10 
2071-2100 0.44 0.75 0.08 0.41 0.45 0.39 
Note: difference compared to the 2015 
It is interesting to compare the EU dynamic welfare loss to that under the static case. 
The EU welfare loss (as a share of GDP) for the 2071-2100 period under the static 
analysis is lower, almost 0.3%. The higher value under the dynamic framework is due to 
the previously noted dynamic mechanisms; thus e.g. impacts compound in time because 
the capital stock gets smaller, leading to additional welfare losses.  
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6. Residential energy demand for heating and cooling 
This section presents analysis of economic consequences of changes in energy demand 
for heating and cooling in the residential sector in Europe for three target horizons: 
2030s, 2080s, and 2oC (always assuming the effect of future climate on the current 
economy). The input into the economic analysis is based on biophysical modelling of 
Kitous and Despres (2017). 
The main conclusions of this section are the following: 
 Climate impacts in Europe: under the high warming scenario, welfare gains could be 
6 bn €, which would be reduced to 4 bn € under the 2oC warming scenario.  
 Central-North Europe would benefit the most, followed by Southern and then 
Northern regions. 
6.1. Energy demand and economic integration 
About 40 % of energy for residential cooling and heating in the EU is used in Central 
Europe North, a further 25% in Central Europe South, another 30% is evenly split 
between the UK & Ireland and Southern Europe, and the remaining 5% is used in 
Northern Europe. Those regional proportions do not change significantly for the 
estimated future energy use because heating demand still dominates cooling demand. 
Demand for energy for heating and cooling in the EU falls in the three climate scenarios 
(2030s, 2080s and 2oC), when compared to the present (Table 8; Figure 13 represents 
the residential demand evolution for the EU regions). The min/max range across the 
climate models are rather small, when compared to those found in other impact 
categories. The EU demand falls from the current 228 mote to 184 mtoe in the 2030 
(176 to 195 mtoe) and 147 mtoe in the 2080s (138 to 156 mtoe). The reduction in 
demand for heating energy more than compensates the additional demand for cooling 
energy.  
Figure 13: Residential demand for heating and cooling energy (mtoe) 
 
20 
Table 8: Residential demand for energy for heating and cooling (mtoe) 
Note: mean and min/max range across the climate models 
The proportion of enegy demand changes in each region is depicted on Figure 14. The 
largest reduction appers in Central Europe North, while the demand in other regions does 
not change that significantly.  
Figure 14: Change in residential energy demand - cumulative by region for the base 
period, 2030s and 2080s and with the approximate 2oC position 
 
Note: Inset plot shows respective damage as fractions of 100% total. 
Figure 15 shows the changes in demand for different fuels used for heating (coal, oil, gas 
electricity) and cooling (electricity). The reduction in overall energy use for heating and 
cooling is driven by lower use of fuels (oil, coal, gas), while demand for electricity 
remains stable or increases. 
  
min        mean    max     min   mean   max   min      mean    max   min      mean    max   
Northern Europe 15 15 15 13 13 14 12 13 14 10 10 11
UK & Ireland 33 33 33 24 25 27 24 25 27 18 20 22
Central Europe North 87 87 87 58 61 65 58 60 65 44 47 51
Central Europe South 55 55 55 46 48 51 46 47 51 36 38 40
Southern Europe 38 38 38 35 36 38 35 36 38 30 31 31




Figure 15: Change in energy demand for heating and cooling by fuel (%) 
 
6.2. Economic implications on EU regions 
Households spend part of their budget on energy for heating and cooling. These 
expenses are part of the subsistence expenditures, i.e. expenditures providing the basic 
necessities of life. A lower energy bill reduces the subsistence spending and allows for 
increased spending on other, welfare-generating products and services. In the economic 
model the change in energy consumption determines the change in obliged consumption 
of the households. Only the portion of households' energy used for heating and cooling is 
changed; the amount of energy used for other purposes is not altered. 
The effect of the reduction in residential energy demand on GDP is small and positive 
(Figure 16). At the EU level the GDP increases between 0.01% and 0.02% for the 2030s 
and 2080s (around 2 bn €). 
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Figure 16: GDP changes due to the residential energy demand shock (% of GDP) 
 
The welfare effects are higher than the GDP effects (Figure 17 vs Figure 16), because the 
reduction in heating and cooling energy demand reduces the obliged consumption of the 
household budget, but does not significantly impact on the production or supply side of 
the economy. 
The largest welfare gains are noted in Northern Europe (0.1-0.15%) and Central Europe 
North (0.1-0.12%). The aggregate EU welfare increase is estimated at 0.06 to 0.08% or 
4 – 6 bn € (Figure 17 and Table 9). 
Figure 17: Welfare changes due to the residential energy demand shock (% of welfare) 
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Table 9: GDP and welfare changes due to the residential energy demand shock  
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7. Agricultural crops  
— This section analyses the economic consequences of agricultural crops productivity 
changes resulting from future climate change, without the CO2 fertilisation effect. The 
future yield changes provided by the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and 
Improvement Project (AgMIP) together with the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model 
Intercomparison project (ISIMIP) are used as an input to the economic model in order 
to assess the macroeconomic implications in the three target horizons: 2030s, 2oC, 
and 2080s. 
— The AgMIP project has conducted multi-model simulations with harmonised data on 
future yield changes. The simulations build on 5 Climate (GCM) Models (HadGEM2-ES, 
IPSL-CM5A-LR, MIROC-ESM-CHEM, GFDL-ESM2M, and NorESM1-M)3 and 7 Global 
Gridded Crop Models (EPIC, GEPIC, IMAGE, LPJmL, LPJ-GUESS, pDSSAT, and 
PEGASUS)4. 
The main conclusions of this section are the following: 
 Climate impacts in Europe: under the high warming scenario, welfare losses could be 
20 bn €.  
 There is a clear North-South gradient regarding damages, increasing when moving to 
southern Europe. 
7.1. Crops yields change and economic integration 
Figure 18 and Table 10 show the average change in yields (without the CO2 fertilisation 
effect), with the mean and min/max range across the climate models. The yield change is 
mainly positive and fairly similar for the 2030s and the 2oC warning scenarios. The yield 
changes remain positive for the 2030s/2oC in Northern Europe, UK & Ireland and Central 
Europe North (2-5%), while Central Europe South and Southern Europe could face small 
yield reductions (-2%). The results for the 2080s show negative yield impacts for all 
regions, with 2-10% yield reductions. The severity of the crops response to climate 
impacts intensifies when moving to the European southern regions.  
The large divergence between the average, minimum and maximum values emphasise 
the high uncertainty associated with the mean estimates. 
  
                                           
3 For details see CMIP5 info at: http://cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/availability.html 
4 Excellent discussion provided in Rosenzweig et al., 2014.  
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Figure 18: Changes in agriculture yields (%) 
 
Table 10: Changes in agriculture yields (%) 
 
Note: mean and min/max range across the climate models 
7.2. Economic implications on EU regions 
Yield change is introduced as a total factor productivity (TFP) change on the agricultural 
crops sector in the CGE model. Total factor productivity is defined as the ratio of 
production or output to the he weighted average of the production factors. So it is 
assumed that the climate shock alters the productivity of all the production factors; i.e. 
climate is considered as an additional production factor.  
The GDP and welfare effects (Figure 19, Figure 20 and Table 11) reflect, in large, the 
pattern of yield change. There is a small positive change in the GDP in the Northern 
regions in the 2030s/2oC horizon, but the 2080s bring very small GDP reductions. In the 
Southern regions, GDP changes are negative across all time and warming scenarios. 
  
min        mean    max     min        mean    max     min mean    max   
Northern Europe -5.6 4.7 24.1 -5.3 5.0 25.0 -20.3 -1.8 13.1
UK & Ireland -17.0 2.0 19.6 -12.2 2.3 19.8 -46.5 -4.2 14.9
Central Europe North -5.1 5.1 39.5 -4.9 4.9 37.8 -43.2 -1.7 37.5
Central Europe South -16.6 -1.0 10.9 -15.6 -0.7 11.6 -52.1 -10.4 8.7
Southern Europe -17.8 -2.1 5.5 -14.9 -1.8 5.6 -40.5 -10.5 0.9
EU -14.1 0.3 16.2 -12.3 0.5 16.1 -43.8 -7.8 12.6




Figure 19: GDP changes due to the crops productivity shock (% of GDP) 
 
In absolute terms, the welfare changes are similar to the GDP changes (Table 11), but 
the percent change in welfare is larger than the percentage change in GDP because the 
household consumption is only one of the GDP components.  
Figure 20: Welfare changes due to the crops productivity shock (% of welfare) 
 
Table 11: GDP and welfare changes due to the crops productivity shock 
 
2030s    2oC 2080s 2030s    2oC 2080s 2030s    2oC 2080s 2030s    2oC 2080s 
Northern Europe 0.07 0.08 -0.04 0.14 0.15 -0.10 0.6 0.6 -0.3 0.5 0.6 -0.4
UK & Irland 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.3 0.4 -0.9 0.3 0.4 -1.0
Central Europe North 0.08 0.08 -0.04 0.14 0.14 -0.11 3.2 3.1 -1.5 2.8 2.7 -2.3
Central Europe South -0.03 -0.02 -0.30 -0.03 -0.01 -0.53 -0.8 -0.5 -8.1 -0.4 -0.2 -7.6
Southern Europe -0.05 -0.04 -0.28 -0.07 -0.06 -0.50 -1.5 -1.2 -8.8 -1.3 -1.0 -8.7
EU 0.01 0.02 -0.16 0.03 0.03 -0.29 1.8 2.3 -19.5 1.9 2.4 -20.0





Forzieri et al. (2017) assess the risk of weather-related hazards to the European 
population in terms of annual numbers of deaths, with specific results regarding 
heatwaves. The heatwave results have been integrated into the JRC PESETA III study. 
The main conclusions of this section are the following: 
 Climate impacts in Europe: under the high warming scenario, welfare losses could be 
150 bn €, which would be reduced to around 66 bn € under the 2oC warming 
scenario.  
 There is a strong North-South gradient regarding damages, largely increasing when 
moving to southern Europe. 
Forzieri et al. (2017) consider the impact due to climate change and population 
dynamics, and find that climate change represents approximately 90% of the overall 
impact. The results refer to the SRES A1B emissions scenario. The ensemble mean of the 
2071-2100 period has been identified as reflecting the high warming scenario of PESETA 
III and the 2040 value (average of the 2011-2040 and 2041-2070 periods) as the 2°C 
warming scenario. The Forzieri et al. (2017) study assumes also constant vulnerability, 
i.e. no additional adaptation measures taken to reduce the heatwave impact or enhance 
human acclimatization to future extreme climate conditions. 
Table 12 represents the estimated mortality due to heatwaves per year in the various 
scenarios: control period (1981-2010) and the 2°C and high warming scenarios; the 
figures of the 2°C and high warming scenarios are relative to that of the control period. 
Under the high warming scenario, mortality largely increases (a factor 50 rise) compared 
to the control or reference period, with around 132,000 additional deaths in the EU. Most 
of the absolute increase could occur in Southern Europe and the Central Europe South 
regions.  













Control  5 95 472 756 1,364 2,692 
Difference 2°C 
warming - control 
46 978 4,407 13,906 38,336 57,674 
Difference high 
warming - control 
113 3,498 11,079 35,997 81,462 132,150 
Units: deaths/year 
Source: Forzieri et al. (2017) 
The 2°C scenario mortality change is smaller than that of the high warming scenario, 
with around 58,000 deaths, a factor 20 rise compared to the control period. The regional 
pattern of mortality increase is similar to that of the high warming scenario, with most of 
the increase occurring in Southern Europe and the Central Europe South regions. 
The number of deaths is considered as damage to the welfare of the population, and it is 
not integrated into the CGE economic model. This damage is calculated by using the 
value of statistical life (VSL) method; the welfare loss is the number of premature deaths 
multiplied by the VSL; the assumed VSL is 1.14 million euro/person (2007 Euro; same 
value for all member states), as in the JRC PESETA II study, the low-end of the range of 
estimates considered in the review of the European Clean Air Policy Package (European 
Commission, 2013). 
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9. Transboundary or spillover analysis 
The PESETA III study has explored the scale of the possible transboundary effects at two 
levels: global and intra-EU. The analysis considers the impacts in both GDP or welfare 
terms, although the welfare metrics is more appropriate for a consistent comparison with 
the standard measure of economic impact in the project, i.e. welfare. 
PESETA analysis builds on the EURO-CORDEX climate data (see section 2.3), which does 
not have a global coverage. As a consequence, the global analysis has been made with 
different climate runs from those in the PESETA study (ISIMIP fast track for agriculture 
and labour productivity and HELIX for river floods and energy). For the global spillover 
analysis the impacts in the EU and in other global regions have been computed 
consistently with the same sets of global climate runs. 
Table 13 represents the scale of the global transboundary effects for the four sectors with 
global coverage (agriculture, labour productivity, river floods and energy). The EU 
column represents the damage in the EU and the RoW (rest of the world) column refers 
to the additional damage in the EU because of climate impacts in the rest of the world 
(i.e. beyond the EU). With the GDP metrics the sum of the additional effects is around 
40% of the EU impact. With the welfare metrics the additional welfare loss is estimated 
to be around 20% of the EU impact. The sector that channels most of the transboundary 
effect is agriculture, because agriculture markets are very much integrated at the global 
scale via international trade.  
Table 13: Global transboundary effects (high warming), bn € 
 
Table 14 shows the scale of the EU impacts which are due to the intra-EU trade linkages, 
using the PESETA III climate runs. The EU column represents the damages in the EU, 
while the "so" column represents the damage that is due to the spillovers (so) or 
transboundary effects. The transboundary effects are already included in the EU effects 
presented in the sectoral sections of this report. The overall scale of the transboundary 
effect due to intra-EU trade is much smaller than in the case of the global analysis. For 
the GDP metrics, it is estimated that around 4% of the overall EU damage is due to 
climate impacts in other EU countries. The welfare transboundary effect is much smaller. 
Table 14: Intra-EU transboundary effects (high warming), bn € 
 
EU ROW EU ROW
Agriculture 19.5 14.5 20 11.1
Labour productivity 45 10.1 50 3.4
River floods 6.1 2.86 15.3 1.2
Energy -2.55 0.04 -6.8 -0.2
Total 68.05 27.5 78.5 15.5
GDP effects Welfare effects
EU so EU so
Agriculture 19.5 -0.4 20.0 -3.5
Labour productivity 29.0 2.9 26.6 1.7
River floods 4.5 0.3 14.6 0.2
Energy 2.4 -0.2 5.8 0.0
Coasts 10.8 0.5 34.6 0.6
Total 66.2 3.1 101.6 -1.0
GDP effects Welfare effects
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The fact that most of the transboundary effects are negative is likely associated to the 
reduction in economic activity in the trading partners, which reduces their imports. This 
effect (known as income effect) seems to dominate the possible positive effects due to 
competitiveness gains (substitution or price effects). 
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10. Overview of economic results 
This section summarises the main findings of the economic analysis of impacts. 
Incomplete perspective of welfare effects 
Figure 21 shows the welfare losses (as percentage of GDP) for the six sectoral impacts in 
the five European regions and the EU in both the high warming and the 2oC scenarios. 
The EU welfare loss under the high warming scenario is estimated to be around 1.9% of 
GDP (€240 bn) and could be reduced by approximately 2/3 in the 2oC scenario (€79 bn). 
It is important to note that Figure 21, while it provides a good general overview, it can 
also offer a misleading perspective of the EU climate damages because the list of 
considered climate impacts is incomplete. The economic climate impacts can be classified 
into three types: known-knowns, known-unknowns and unknown-unknowns. The impacts 
of Figure 21 represent the known-knowns type. Some of the PESETA climate impacts, 
however, have not been integrated into the economic framework (e.g. habitat losses) 
and, notably, other climate impacts are not integrated into the PESETA study like 
possible impacts due to ecosystem services losses - those represent the known-
unknowns type: it is known that the impacts exist but their economic implication are 
unknown. Finally, there might be the unknown-unknowns, such as climate phenomena 
not considered (e.g. unknown catastrophic consequences of climate tipping points) or 
unknown relationships between climate and the economy. Therefore, the sum of impacts 
represented in Figure 21 must not be considered as the total economic cost of the 
specific climate change scenarios. 
Another caveat relates to the inclusion of health impacts in Figure 21. The welfare losses 
of the other five climate impacts are derived from the economic model, so it seems 
appropriate to compare those welfare losses with GDP. On the contrary, the health 
welfare losses are valued through the VSL, which is not a market effect and, therefore, 
its comparison with GDP can be questioned.  




The North-South divide 
Figure 22 represents the relative geographical distribution of climate damages; in the 
figure the region with the lowest net welfare damage (as a share of GDP), Northern 
Europe, has an index of one. The regional distribution of the welfare losses is highly 
asymmetric, showing a clear North-South divide in the geography of climate impacts in 
Europe: the southern Europe regions are much more affected than the rest of Europe, by 
a factor of five (Central Europe South region) to eight (Southern Europe region). 
Figure 22: The North-South divide for the high warming scenario  
 
Note: Welfare impact (% GDP) in Northern Europe = 1 
Figure 23 shows the relative importance of the climate impacts across the EU regions. 
Health impacts are not represented because they might distort the relative scale of the 
other five impacts. As one moves south impacts appear to be higher as a share of GDP; 
the previous conclusion of the North-South divide is confirmed for agriculture, labour 
productivity and river floods, but not for coastal damages, which are relatively higher in 
Northern Europe and UK & Ireland, and the energy impacts, with a net positive effect in 
all regions. The EU region with the highest welfare losses under the high warming 
scenario would be Southern Europe. 
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Figure 23: The geography of impacts for the high warming scenario (without health 
impacts) 
 
Avoided climate impacts with the 2oC scenario 
The extent to which climate impacts are avoided under the 2oC scenario is represented in 
Figure 24 (without neither the health impacts nor the positive impacts). The size of the 
pies is proportional to the net total welfare loss. 
Figure 24: Distribution of climate impacts under the 2oC scenario (left) and high 
warming scenario (right) 
 
The ranking of sectoral climate damages under the high warming scenario are, in order 
of importance, coastal areas, labour productivity, agriculture and river flooding. All the 
sectoral welfare losses would be substantially lower under the 2oC scenario. 
Spillovers from the rest of the world 
The spillover effects relate to climate impacts occurring outside of the EU regions 
affecting the EU via international trade. Those effects are estimated for agriculture, 
labour productivity, energy and river flooding. The global transboundary effect in terms 
of GDP is represented in Figure 25. Figure 26 shows the transboundary effects in welfare 
terms. 
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Figure 25: Global transboundary climate change effects in the EU, via trade, in GDP 
terms (bn €), under 2ºC and high-emissions scenarios5 
 
Figure 26: Global transboundary climate change effects in the EU, via trade, in welfare 
terms (bn €), under 2ºC and high-emissions scenarios (bn €)5 
 
With the GDP metrics the sum of the additional effects is around 40% of the EU impact, 
while with the welfare metrics the additional welfare loss is estimated to be around 20% 
of the EU impact. The magnitude of the spillover effect depends on two aspects: the 
severity of climate impacts in the rest of the world regions and the intensity of trade 
between the regions and the EU. Most of the EU transboundary effects originate in either 
the Americas or Asia. 
With respect to the sector of climate impact, about half of the GDP transboundary effects 
to the EU are due to the agricultural crops, which mainly affect central and southern EU 
regions. Another one-third of the transboundary–induced welfare loss originates in the 
labour productivity reduction, affecting mainly Central North Europe.  
                                           
5 For graphical clarity, the results are further aggregated to 13 regions as detailed in 
 
Table 16 in Annex. 
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11. Conclusions 
This study has integrated six climate impacts into a consistent economic framework and 
derived a series of economic implications. Several key conclusions can be noted. The EU 
welfare loss under the high warming scenario may be around 1.9% of GDP (€240 bn) 
and could be reduced by approximately 2/3 in the 2°C scenario (€79 bn). Yet one cannot 
derive definitive conclusions about the benefits of climate mitigation (the difference of 
impacts between the high warming scenario and the 2°C scenario) from this study, as 
the study covers a limited set of impacts. 
It is also interesting that climate impacts would be largely asymmetric across the EU 
regions, with the southern regions relatively much more affected than the rest of the EU 
regions (the North-South divide). There can be significant global transboundary effects, 
i.e.  cross-border climate impacts to the EU, coming from the rest of the world.  
The study is subject to a series of caveats. There is a vast uncertainty permeating the 
biophysical and economic analyses. The range of min/max impacts around the mean due 
to climate model uncertainty is rather large. It is important that the users of the report 
do not overestimate the confidence with which the quantitative statements are made. 
Even if the economic analysis provides the impression of homogeneity, the reader should 
note that the input to the economic model is a diverse and heterogeneous set of climate 
impacts, and that the relative comparability is also reached via a set of assumptions that 
can influence the aggregation of sectoral results and the overall economic analysis. 
There are some clear avenues for future research, including further integration across 
impact models (e.g. connecting water and energy modelling), deepening the analysis of 
key impact areas (like human mortality) or adding potentiall new key impact areas, like 
the valuation of ecosystem services. 
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Annex: Economic models 
The CaGE model 
GEM-E3-CAGE (see Pycroft et al. 2016) is a static multi-country, multi-sector CGE model 
of the world economy linking the economies through endogenous bilateral trade. The 
CAGE database is mainly based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, 
version 8 (Narayanan et al., 2012). The GEM-E3-CAGE model has 19 sectors (Table 17) 
and 25 world regions (Table 16). 
Making assumptions about the detailed sectoral structure of the European economy over 
a time-span of many years seems a really cumbersome task, which would introduce 
more uncertainty than the potential insight gain. Because of this long-term perspective of 
climate impact, the CGE economic analysis adopted in our study is (quasi-) static; the 
study looks at what the effects of climate change would be if the future climate would 
occur today, under the current socioeconomic conditions. The estimated economic 
impacts represent a level shift or one-off change in welfare or GDP, and not a change in 
the growth rates. In other words, in the CAGE static assessment the possible effects on 
economic growth due to the impacts on savings and investment decisions are not 
considered.  
However, this impact assessment provides a solid ground to providing an estimate of the 
integrated damage: the comparison of the welfare (or GDP) levels obtained with today's 
economic structure with present-day climate to the welfare (or GDP) levels obtained with 
a warmer climate with the same economic structure provide a (conservative but robust) 
measure of the impact that climate change could have with respect to the present levels 
of welfare (or GDP).  
There are three main channels through which the direct damages as computed by the 
biophysical impacts affect the economy (see Figure 27). Two of the transmission 
channels would affect the supply side of the economy and a third one the demand side. 
Figure 27: Overview of climate shocks affecting the economy 
 
Regarding the supply side, firstly, climate change is affecting the productivity of the 
economy. The productivity is defined as the unit of output per unit of input. The clearest 
case is that of agriculture: climate change can lead to reduced yields (output), while all 
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other factors of production (inputs) are the same. Secondly, climate change can alter the 
capital stock of the economy, for instance when river floods damage infrastructure. These 
supply-side effects would trigger a series of adjustments in the economy also indirectly 
affecting sectors and regions different to that where climate change is impacting directly. 
To further elaborate on those examples, the lack of domestic agricultural production will 
provoke a higher food imports demand, and the capital equipment destroyed will need 
replacement, which calls for investments that will impede other investment opportunities. 
Regarding the demand side of the economy, climate change can also influence 
consumption decisions. For instance, damage to residential buildings due to a flood leads 
to a change in the consumption behavior of households as they would repair the damage 
and consequently reduce other consumption expenditures. There would be a substitution 
of consumption: additional consumption to repair the dwellings damage (e.g. buy a new 
fridge) and an equivalent reduction in consumption (e.g. less leisure expenditure), 
keeping the overall consumption constant. As the reparation of the flood damage is part 
of obliged or compulsory consumption (which would not occur in the absence of climate 
change), the economic model interprets that there is a welfare loss associated to the 
damage to residential buildings.  
Table 15 details how the different impact categories have been implemented in the CAGE 
model. The agriculture impact model produces estimates of agriculture yields, which have 
been implemented in the model as changes in productivity in the agriculture sector. The 
effects due to river and coastal floods have two main components: damages to 
residential buildings and damages to production sectors. The former component is 
interpreted as an additional obliged consumption of households, which leads to a welfare 
loss - due to the fact that there is now less money available for the (non-obliged) 
consumption of (other) goods. The latter component has been implemented as a capital 
loss. Heating and cooling demand changes are modelled as changes in obliged 
consumption. The number of premature deaths (mortality) is considered as damage to 
the welfare of the population. This damage is calculated by using the value of statistical 
life (VSL) method. 
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Table 15: Implementation of sectoral climate impacts in CAGE 
 
  
Impact Biophysical model output Model implementation
Agriculture Yield change per crop Agriculture productivity change 
Energy Change in heating and cooling 
demand 
Change in obliged consumption
Labour productivity Change in labour productivity Change in labour productivity
River floods Agriculture losses Agriculture productivity change
Residential buildings damages Additional obliged consumption
Production activities losses Capital loss
Coastal areas Agriculture losses Agriculture productivity change
Residential buildings damages Additional obliged consumption
Production activities losses Capital loss
Mortality Change in mortality Welfare loss (ex-post)
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Table 16: List of region-codes and geographical aggregation 
Region Countries in region 
Aggregation for 
presenting the global 
spillovers 
China China East Asia 
Japan Japan East Asia 
Korea Korea East Asia 
Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia 
Russia Russia Russia 
India India South Asia 
USA USA North America 
Canada Canada North America 
Mexico Mexico North America 
Brazil Brazil South America 
South Africa South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
UK & Ireland UK, Ireland EU28 
Northern Europe 










Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia 
EU28 
Southern Europe 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Croatia 
EU28 
Australasia Australia, New Zealand, rest of Oceania Australasia 
South Asia 
Bangladesh, Iran, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, 




Botswana, Cote d'Ivore, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Uganda, South Central Africa, 
Central Africa, rest of Eastern Africa, Rest of 
South African Customs Union, Rest of Western 
Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Rest of Europe 
Albania, Switzerland, Norway, Rest of Eastern 
Europe, Rest of EFTA, Rest of Europe 
Rest of Europe 
Rest of South-
east Asia 
Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Rest of East Asia, Rest of Southeast 
Asia, Rest of the World 
South Asia 
Rest of Former 
USSR 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Rest of 
Former Soviet Union 
Rest of Former USSR 
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Middle East & 
North Africa 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, 
Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Rest of North Africa, Rest of 
Western Asia 
Middle East & North Africa 
Central America 
and Caribbean 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panamá, El Salvador, Rest of Central America, 
Caribbean, Rest of North America 
Central America and 
Caribbean 
Rest of South 
America 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Rest of 
South America 
South America 
Table 17: List of sector codes and sectoral aggregation 
Agriculture Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses, animal products nec, raw milk, wool, silk-worm 
cocoons, fishing 
Crops Paddy rice, wheat, cereal, grains nec, vegetables, fruit, nutsv oil seeds, sugar cane, sugar 
beet, plant-based fibers, crops nec 
Forestry Forestry 
Coal Mining Coal 
Crude Oil Extraction Oil 
Natural Gas Gas, gas manufacture, distribution 
Refined Oil Petroleum, coal products 
Electricity Electricity 
Metals Ferrous metals, metals nec, metal products 
Chemicals Chemical, rubber, plastic products 






Motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment nec 
Other Equipment Machinery and equipment nec, manufactures nec 
Consumer Goods Bovine meat products, meat products nec, vegetable oils and fats, airy products, 
processed rice, sugar, food products nec, beverages and tobacco products, textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products, wood products 
Construction Construction 
Transport Transport nec, water transport, air transport 




Recreational and other services, public administration, Defense, Education, Health 
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The MaGE model 
The long term GDP losses associated with the damages of sea level rise to capital stock, 
residential buildings and agriculture are assessed with an econometric model called MaGE 
(Fouré et al. 2013). It is based on a three-factors production function, i.e. labour, capital 
and energy, plus two forms of technological progress, one for the aggregate bundle of 
labour and capital and the other specific for energy, i.e. energy productivity. MaGE is 
fitted with United Nations and International Labour Office labour projections, and includes 
econometric estimations of the equations for projecting the following variables: 
(i) capital accumulation,  
(ii) savings rate,  
(iii) relationship between savings and investment rate,  
(iv) education,  
(v) female participation to the labor market  
(vi) technological progress (which includes energy and total factor productivity).  
The model accounts for energy constraints by including energy use in the production 
function and by taking account of rents accruing to oil exporting countries. The model 
therefore proposes a novel approach to growth analysis which assumes limited possibility 
for energy and the capital/labour bundle to substitute each other; in other words energy 
is a critical factor of production and capital and labour can compensate its scarcity only to 
a limited extent. The model's main concept is the idea of convergence, which is also 
known as the catch-up effect. According to this hypothesis poorer countries income per 
capita grows faster than in advanced economies thus leading to a convergence or catch 
up of the first over the second in the long term. The catch up idea is applied in the 
present analysis for some of the most important equations of the model, i.e. saving rate, 
technical progress, energy productivity or education. The underlying assumptions 
regarding total population, population age structure and the education level are based on 
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